Use case
A security or platform engineer, before wiring a third-party MCP server into the company's AI agent, runs this CLI against the agent's MCP config to scan for tool poisoning, rug pulls, hardcoded secrets, command injection and supply-chain risk, and gets a CI-ready SARIF report to decide whether to approve the server.
Today teams read MCP configs and tool descriptions by hand, or lean on generic SAST/SCA and code review; those tools do not model MCP-specific tool poisoning or rug pulls, and public materials show no dedicated substitute.
MCP servers enter the agent's tool-call chain through config, and third-party tool descriptions or dependencies can change after onboarding; a poisoning or rug-pull event lets the agent act with corporate credentials. Public materials give no incident frequency or loss figures, so severity is inferred from workflow structure.
xOcto's call
Demand is evidenced
Trend: once AI agents call external tools, configuration itself becomes an attack surface and security review moves ahead of code into agent configs. Entry: start with platform teams already wiring many third-party MCP servers, selling the scan as a CI gate or pre-launch audit; no pricing or customers are disclosed, so the selling model remains unverified.
Reason to use it
Why users would choose it
Versus manual config review, it takes the MCP config as input, enumerates tools and dependencies automatically and emits SARIF, so a security engineer can gate the check in CI and catch issues before merge rather than after onboarding; this is structural inference from product capability, not confirmed by user feedback or cases.
Where the easy answer breaks down
The tension worth following
An English validation note will follow from the public evidence.
If this is your job
Worth trying. Versus manual config review, it takes the MCP config as input, enumerates tools and dependencies automatically and emits SARIF, so a security engineer can gate the check in CI and catch issues before merge rather than after onboarding; this is structural inference from product capability, not confirmed by user feedback or cases.
Entry and what to borrow
Trend: once AI agents call external tools, configuration itself becomes an attack surface and security review moves ahead of code into agent configs. Entry: start with platform teams already wiring many third-party MCP servers, selling the scan as a CI gate or pre-launch audit; no pricing or customers are disclosed, so the selling model remains unverified.